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THE IMPACT OF JURY SIZE ON THE COURT SYSTEM
In recent years, the pressures of increasing costs and mounting case
backlogs have generated many suggestions for reducing the number of
jurors on the petite jury from twelve to some lesser number, usually
six.' While the practical necessity of saving time and money may be of
primary concern, there are other values that may be endangered by
altering the character of the jury. This comment focuses on the contro-
versy engendered by proposals for reducing jury size. An attempt is
made to raise important issues, to suggest areas for further research,
and to draw some conclusions based on available data.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Provisions
Two provisions of the United States Constitution are at the heart of
the controversy over jury size. The right to trial by jury is one of the
fundamental safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants by the sixth
amendment.2 Similarly, the seventh amendment provides the founda-
tion for the availability of jury trial in civil cases.' Neither amendment
specifically states the number of jurors required. Thus, it has become
necessary for the courts to interpret these amendments in an attempt to
determine the constitutionality of proposals to abandon the twelve-per-
son jury.4
B. Federal Statutes and Rules
Pursuant to its authority to establish a judiciary,5 Congress has dele-
gated rulemaking power with respect to the federal courts to the United
1. E.g., Tamm, The Fie-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment, 51 GEO.
L.J. 120 (1962).
2. The sixth amendment reads in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
3. The seventh amendment reads in pertinent part: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
. " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. For cases interpreting the sixth and seventh amendments regarding jury size, see notes
14, 23-25 infra and accompanying text.
5. "Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. . ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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States Supreme Court.6 Along with this general grant of rulemaking
authority, 28 U.S.C. section 2072 contains express provisions preserv-
ing the right to trial by jury.7 Acting pursuant to this statutory author-
ity, the Supreme Court has promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, one of which provides that civil juries shall consist of twelve
persons unless the parties stipulate otherwise.8 In criminal cases, Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 provides for trial by a jury of
twelve persons unless waived by the defendant.'
C. Developments in the Case Law
While the federal rules' ° seem relatively clear on the requirement for
jury size, the courts have found it necessary to decide upon the propri-
ety of juries of less than twelve. This has occurred because state courts
are not covered by the federal rules and because the rules themselves
are subject to attack on constitutional grounds.
In considering jury trial requirements of the states, the Supreme
Court was initially faced with the question of whether the sixth and
seventh amendments are incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
due process clause and thereby made applicable to the states. The pro-
visions of the seventh amendment have not yet been applied to the
states.' The traditional view had been that the sixth amendment was
likewise inapplicable to the states.' 2 However, in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana,13 the Court reversed its earlier position and held that the due
6. "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and the courts of appeal of the United States in civil actions. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
7. "Such rules shall. . . preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." Id.
8. "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve
." FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
9. Rule 23 reads in part:
(b) Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in
writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than
12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by ajury of less than 12 should the court find
it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after trial commences.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
10. See notes 8-9 supra.
11. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 268 (1947); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).
12. E.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). In Maxwell, a criminal defendant ap-
pealed his conviction by an eight-member jury in a Utah state court. The Supreme Court
had held earlier that a twelve-member jury was required by the sixth amendment in federal
criminal trials. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). But, in Maxwell the Court held
that the rule of Thompson did not apply in state trials because the fourteenth amendment
did not make the sixth amendment binding on the states. 176 U.S. at 604.
13. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires state procedures
to conform to the specifications of the sixth amendment.'
4
Having laid the groundwork in Duncan, the Court squarely faced the
issue of jury size in criminal cases in Williams v. Florida.5 In Williams,
the defendant's conviction by a six-member jury was held to satisfy the
requirements of the sixth amendment.16 In the several years that have
elapsed since the Williams decision, there has been a great deal of em-
pirical research into the relationship between jury size and jury per-
formance, 17 and commentators have both supported"8 and criticized' 9
the position of the Court. Despite this controversy, the Court reaf-
firmed the Williams decision in the recent case of Ballew v. Georgia.
20
In Ballew, the use of a five-member jury in state criminal trials was
struck down as violative of due process.2' It therefore appears that six
14. In Duncan, a defendant had been convicted without a jury in accordance with Louisi-
ana law. The Court held that this constituted a denial of due process of law, and that the
sixth amendment jury trial requirement was applicable to the states by virtue of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, Duncan specifically overruled Maxwell Id. at 155.
15. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Florida law, at the time, provided for a twelve-member jury only
in capital cases. Id. at 80 n.3. When the defendant in a robbery case requested the twelve-
member jury, his request was denied, and he appealed.
16. Id. at 86. The Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by
jury was satisfied by ajury of six since there was no evidence that six-member juries did not
perform as well as juries of twelve. Id. at 10 1-02.
17. See, e.g., Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man versus Twelve-Man Juries,
14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 326 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Pabst]; M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SAKS]; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARI-
SON OF SIX- AND TWELVE-MEMBER CIVIL JURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY
COURTS (1972) [hereinafter cited as I.J.A. STUDY]; Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member
Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Michigan Study]; Note, An Empirical Study of the Six-and Twelve-Member Jury Deci-
sion-Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 712 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jury Decision-
Making Processes].
18. See, e.g., Note, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 87 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Zeisel, . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel]; Note, The Effect ofJury Size on
the Probability of Conviction:An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
529 (1971).
20. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The defendant, Ballew, appealed his conviction on the grounds
that Georgia's use of a five-member jury violated his right to trial by jury as guaranteed by
the sixth and fourteenth amendments. After an extensive review of the literature of the
effects of size on jury performance, the Court concluded that a five-member jury was, in-
deed, unconstitutional. 1d. at 245. But, at the same time, the Court reaffirmed the holding
of Williams that a six-member jury is permissible, declaring:
While we adhere to, and reaffirm our holding in Williams v. Florida, these studies,
most of which have been made since Williams was decided in 1970, lead us to conclude
that the purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired,
and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.
Id. at 239.
21. See note 20 supra.
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is the smallest number of jurors that is constitutionally permissible in
state criminal trials.
It is worth noting, however, that the Court may be much closer to a
reversal of Williams than a superficial reading of Ballew might indi-
cate. First, since Ballew dealt with the constitutionality of a five-mem-
ber jury, the Court's statement in support of Williams22 is dictum.
Second, almost none of the studies relied upon in Ballew refer in any
way to a five-member jury but, rather, support the proposition that a
twelve-person jury is superior to one with six persons.23 This is pre-
cisely the argument the Court expressly rejected in Williams when it
held that the six-person jury was constitutional.2 4
The other context in which the Court has discussed the nature of the
right to jury trial is when the constitutionality of a federal rule is in
question. In Colgrove v. Bailin,25 a local rule providing for six-member
juries in all civil cases was upheld because the contrary provision of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48,26 providing for juries of twelve
unless the parties stipulate otherwise, was held to lack constitutional
22. Id.
23. In an attempt to show that juries of five are inferior to juries of six in important
respects, the Ballew Court almost invariably cited studies that actually indicate that juries of
six are significantly inferior to juries of twelve. Although the examples of this weakness in
the Court's analysis are too numerous to permit exhaustive discussion, some are worth men-
tioning. First, in discussing the quality of jury deliberation, the Court cited a study by
Thomas and Fink, correctly summarizing the findings of that study as follows: "[TJhe find-
ings of 31 studies in which the size of groups from 2 to 20 members was an important
variable. . .[indicated]. . .that there were no conditions under which smaller groups were
superior in the quality of group performance and group productivity." 435 U.S. at 233 n. II
(citing Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371, 376 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Thomas & Fink]). Later, in discussing the accuracy of jury decisions, the Court
cited evidence from SAKS, supra note 20, in which mock trials were held before undergradu-
ates and former jurors. The study indicated that when former jurors were used, the percent-
age of "correct" decisions (Saks seems to define correctness in terms of consistency; thus, the
decision most consistently produced is the correct one) was "71% for the 12-person groups
and 57% for the six-person groups." 435 U.S. at 235. In both of these examples, the evi-
dence cited by the Court strongly indicates that juries of twelve are superior to juries of six
in important ways. Furthermore, on one of the few occasions that the Court used statistical
research to directly support its position, it cited Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Deter-
mine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WASH. L.Q. 933, 946
[hereinafter cited as Nagel & Neef], which indicates that a jury of between six and eight
members is an optimum size. 435 U.S. at 234-35. But the Court failed to mention that this
result is radically altered by a slight modification of the assumptions of the statistical model.
See text accompanying notes 117-21 infra.
24. In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the contention that juries of twelve are
superior to juries of six in any significant way, and concluded that "there is no discernable
difference between the results reached by the two different sized juries." 399 U.S. at 101.
25. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 48. See note 8 supra, for the text of this rule.
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foundation.2"
It remains to be decided whether a twelve-member jury is constitu-
tionally required in federal criminal cases. Williams held that the sixth
amendment does not require a twelve-member jury in state criminal
cases.2" Logically, it would follow from the reasoning of Colgrove
29
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23,30 providing for twelve-
member juries in federal criminal trials, is without constitutional foun-
dation, and that a federal court could adopt a local rule providing for
smaller juries in criminal cases. However, this argument assumes that
the states and the federal government are to be treated identically for
purposes of interpreting the sixth amendment. This assumption may
have been rendered untenable by the rather anomalous result in
Apodaca v. Oregon3 that unanimity is required in federal jury trials
but may be abandoned by the states.32
On the few occasions when it has considered the questions raised by
the jury size issue, the Ninth Circuit has closely adhered to the position
of the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Williams
when it ruled in Colgrove that federal civil juries might consist of less
than twelve persons.33 In Dashiell v. Keauhou-Kona Co., " the Ninth
Circuit again followed Williams, rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Wil-
liams did not apply in diversity cases.35 The Ninth Circuit has also
consistently and strictly applied the Supreme Court's holding in Col-
grove.36 For example, Colgrove was directly relied on in rejecting the
plaintiff's claim of a right to a jury of twelve in Calhoun v. United
27. The central rationale of Colgrove was that "it cannot be said that 12 members is a
substantive aspect of the right of trial by jury." 413 U.S. at 157. The Court reasoned that
the requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 48 that juries must consist of twelve, except where the
parties stipulate to the contrary, lacks constitutional foundation. Id. at 163.
28. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
30. For the text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 23, see note 10 supra.
31. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
32. In Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406, four Justices held that unanimity was not required in
either state or federal jury trials while four other Justices held that unanimity was required
in both. Justice Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, took the position that while una-
nimity could be abandoned by the states, it was indispensable in federal jury trials. 406 U.S.
at 369-70 (Powell's comments are actually part of the companion decision of Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), but they relate to Apodoca). See generally Jacobsohn, The
Unanimous Verdict; Politics and the Jury Trial, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 39 [hereinafter cited as
Jacobsohn].
33. 456 F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1972), afrid, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
34. 487 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 961.
36. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
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States.3 7 The Ninth Circuit has been somewhat more expansive in its
application of Apodaca. Relying on Apodaca, the Ninth Circuit held
that there is no constitutionally protected right to representation of par-
ticular minority groups on a jury.38 In United States v. Lopez,3 9 the
Ninth Circuit held that the unanimity requirement cannot be waived,
again relying on Apodaca. Finally, based on both Williams and
Apodaca, the Ninth Circuit held that jury size is not a question of con-
stitutional stature.4 °
II. THE JURY SIZE DEBATE
A. Issues
There are three related, yet distinct, questions that arise as to jury
size. First, what size jury is constitutionally required? Since the sev-
enth amendment is not applicable to the states,4' the size of state civil
juries is a matter of state law. In state criminal trials, however, it is
clear that a six-member jury is the minimum acceptable.4 2 The issue of
constitutional requirements of jury size in federal criminal cases is still
not absolutely settled,4 3 but, as the law now stands, the six-member
jury is acceptable in federal civil cases.' These conclusions about the
constitutionality of the six-member jury may be subject to change,
however, because of the weaknesses of the Ballew decision.45 In addi-
tion, the Court in Colgrove approved the six-member jury largely be-
cause it had done so in Williams;46 the Williams Court did so because it
believed that the evidence indicated that juries of six performed just as
well as juries of twelve in all important respects.47 But, current knowl-
edge about jury performance, while something less than definitive,
tends to indicate that juries of twelve are superior to juries of six.
48
37. 591 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979).
38. Bradley v. Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. 581 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1978).
40. Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976).
41. See note I 1 supra and accompanying text.
42. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
43. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
44. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
45. See notes 22-24, supra and accompanying text.
46. Although the Colgrove Court did take note of some research conducted subsequent to
Williams, 413 U.S. at 159 n.15, the decision seemed to rest on the conclusion that "[s]ince
[Williams], much has been written about the six-member jury but nothing that persuades us
to depart from the conclusion reached in Williams." 413 U.S. at 158-59 (footnote omitted).
47. See note 24 supra.
48. See, e.g., Zeisel, Twelve is Just, 10 TRIAL 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1974).
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Thus, the constitutional issues may not be as well settled as they seem
to be initially.
Second, what is the optimum size for a jury?49 Presumably, a ra-
tional and just society would, within the confines of constitutional re-
quirements,50 choose to use the optimum size jury. This is a policy
issue that can best be resolved by an empirical analysis of jury perform-
ance 51 and a determination of the relative values to be assigned to the
competing interests served by the judicial system. Mathematical mod-
eling techniques have been used to demonstrate that the degree to
which a society is willing to protect the innocent at the cost of freeing
some of the guilty is a critical factor in determining an optimum jury
size." Another important consideration is how much expense and
court congestion will be tolerated in order to obtain a given quality of
jury performance. 3
Third, is the twelve- or the six-member jury'truly superior? In sev-
eral respects, this is the central issue in the jury size controversy. The
Williams decision established the principle that constitutional issues
with regard to jury size were to be resolved by an analysis of jury per-
formance as a function of size.54 Thus, if the six-member jury is found
to perform at least as well as the twelve-member jury in all important
respects, then Williams, Colgrove, and Ballew will all have a sound em-
pirical and legal foundation.55 But, if the twelve-member jury is found
49. Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 964-65, develop a deductive model designed to deter-
mine the optimum jury size. The optimum jury size is that size at which the number of
errors the jury makes is minimized. There are two type of errors which the authors consid-
ered important: the number of innocent persons wrongly convicted and the number of guilty
persons wrongly acquitted. Id. at 945. In an attempt to determine the relative weight to be
assigned to these types of errors, they relied on Blackstone's statement that it is preferable
that ten guilty people should go free than that one innocent man should be wrongly con-
victed. Id. at 945 n. 18. Because of this ten to one weighting scheme, Nagel and Neef deter-
mine the optimum jury size to be somewhere between six and eight. Id. at 946.
50. See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
51. See discussion in section II. B. infra.
52. Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 965.
53. Id. at 9.64-65.
54. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
55. Inasmuch as Williams was founded on the notion that juries of six perform at least as
well as juries of twelve, supra note 24, a scientific confirmation of this fact would place
Williams on solid ground. Colgrove, in turn, based its approval of the six-member jury on
Williams, supra note 46, and therefore definitive proof of the soundness of the Williams
holding would also tend to strengthen the decision in Colgrove. Furthermore, the weakness
of Ballew, supra note 23, would be less striking if there were substantial scientific documen-
tation of the holding in Williams that juries of six perform as well as juries of twelve. Also,
the reaffirmation of Williams by the Court in Ballew, supra note 20, would be more credible
if based on empirical evidence and statistical verification.
1979] 1109
LOYOLA OF LOS 4NGELES LAW REVIEW [
to be superior in important ways, then these decisions and the constitu-
tionality of the six-member jury should be questioned. Furthermore,
deciding between six- and twelve-member juries56 may be much more
important than determining an optimum jury size because, as a practi-
cal matter, most advocates of smaller juries and most jurisdictions that
have adopted smaller juries 7 select six as the alternative rather than
twelve. Therefore, the remainder of this comment focuses on the argu-
ments for and against juries of six and twelve members respectively. In
this discussion, unlike other comments, 58 an attempt is made to give
some coverage to all relevant points rather than limiting discussion to a
single criterion such as the effects of size on verdicts. This more general
approach, however, requires a more extensive balancing of values than
more limited discussions.
B. Methodological Considerations
Before proceeding to an analysis of the arguments in the jury size
controversy, some general comments should be made regarding the
techniques used in the research relied upon by the courts and commen-
tators. It is important to note, however, that no research design can be
perfect and that the following comments are merely intended to give
the reader some rational basis for assigning weight to the evidence to
be discussed in later sections.
One type of evidence often relied on in the debate over jury size59 is
empirical research using results of actual jury trials. One problem with
this type of research is that differences in jury verdicts that are attribu-
table to differences injury size may reasonably be expected to occur in
only a small fraction of actual trials because "most cases are clear.
' 60
56. E.g., authorities cited in note 17 supra.
57. E.g., the jurisdictions mentioned by the Court in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 244
n.43: Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, and Massachusetts.
58. See, e.g., Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, wherein the authors discuss the jury size ques-
tion solely in terms of the correctness of the verdict, as it relates to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.
59. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 232-37.
60. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and The Jury
Size Cases, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 643, 648 (1975) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Lempert]. Lempert reanalyzed data presented by H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE AMERICAN JURY], and concluded that verdict
differences due to jury size can reasonably be expected to appear in a maximum of 14.1% of
all cases. Lempert, supra, at 653. This result is confirmed by Nagel's and Neef's finding that
juror behavior reflects their personal background approximately 11% of the time. See Nagel
& Neef, supra note 23, at 952. Nagel and Neef conclude that all differences between juries
of various sizes is attributable to this 11% "independent mind" component. Lempert, supra
note 26, at 954 & n.30.
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This means that even if verdict differences due to jury size appear in a
large number of cases, this fact may not be appreciated or discussed by
commentators because of customs in the scientific community regard-
ing statistical significance.6' It also means that researchers may have to
use extremely large sample sizes before they will be able to discern any
statistically significant differences between verdicts of different-sized
juries.62 The cost and impracticality of large scale research based on
actual jury trials may make such an experiment virtually impossible.63
Another problem with much empirical research using actual cases is
that there are insufficient controls for influential factors. For example,
one must insure that the types of cases tried before six- and twelve-
member juries are really the same.' Also, studies that review jury ver-
dicts before and after a jurisdiction changes from twelve to six jurors
may fail to control for other simultaneous changes that could affect the
outcomes of trials.65
Still another potential difficulty with this type of research is that it
61. There are two important types of errors in empirical research. Type I errors occur
when the researcher assumes a relationship to exist between two variables when none actu-
ally exists. In the jury size research, a type I error would occur if the experiment indicated
that size affected jury performance when, in fact, it did not. Type II errors occur when one
rejects a hypothesis which is, in fact, true. This would happen if a researcher concluded that
there exists no relationship between jury size and performance when such a relationship
does actually exist. Lempert, supra note 60 at 657. The conventions of social science re-
search, however, which are overly concerned with guarding against type I error, may mask
the existence of a real relationship between size and jury verdicts. Id. at 659.
62. Of course, the possibility of spotting trends associated with jury size increases with
the number of trials (and, hence, the number of divergent verdicts) examined. If a
sufficiently large number of verdicts were examined some of the objections that I have
made. . . would be weakened. However, given the expense involved. . . , the desire
of researchers to finish their work in a reasonably short time, and general expectations
about what can be proved with relatively small samples, I would guess that reports of
an "ideal design" experiment would be based on between 100 and 300 trials.
Lempert, supra note 60, at 653 n.37.
63. Id.
64. Jury size research experimenters sometimes select jurisdictions where the size of the
jury is optional, e.g., I.J.A. Study, supra note 17, at 1. But there is a danger in this technique.
If those cases in which the parties chose the twelve-member jury were systematically
different from the cases in which they chose the six-member jury, differences associated
with the different-sized juries might in fact be attributable to the differing nature of the
cases heard. . . . It is clear that such a systematic difference existed in the New Jersey
study [where] twelve member juries were chosen when more money was at stake.
Lempert, supra note 60, at 646 n.12 (referring to the I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 17).
65. An example of the difficulties with "before and after" studies is the problem encoun-
tered in the Michigan Study, supra note 17. At approximately the same time that jury size
was decreased from twelve to six, Michigan also made substantive changes in the law affect-
ing the incidence of pre-trial settlement. This meant that the types of cases heard by the six-
member juries were not necessarily comparable with those heard by the twelve-member
juries. Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel & Diamond].
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rests on the inaccurate assumption that juries are randomly selected.66
In addition, research that looks only at verdict differences may ignore
differences between six- and twelve-member juries in other areas.67 Fi-
nally, in order to develop an experimental procedure that is sufficiently
random to produce valid results, it may be necessary to resort to meas-
ures that may be unconstitutional68 and thus impossible for practical
purposes.
To circumvent many of these problems, some researchers have at-
tempted to evaluate the impact of changing the number of jurors by
conducting laboratory type experiments. But these experiments have
their own weaknesses that must be recognized. First, such experiments
may or may not use actual jurors. If actual jurors are not used, re-
searchers must be careful to avoid groups that differ in important ways
from the normal jury selection pool.69 Second, to be useful, the group
must be asked to solve a problem that is analytically similar to, and as
complex as, the case that a jury would typically hear.70 Third, because
the participants in the experiment know they are not deciding actual
cases, there may be differences in the deliberation process due to the
66. ' The sampling model postulates that jurors are selected by some independent random
process. Although one may assume that a particular venire is selected from a given popula-
tion at random, it is clear that chance does not entirely determine the final composition of a
sitting jury." Lempert, supra note 60, at 664-65 (footnote omitted).
67. When discussing the effect of size on the probability of conviction, Nagel and Neef
point out the interesting possibility that cancellation effects may mask actual differences:
The same conviction rate would not mean that a change in jury size had no effect on the
probability of conviction. Presumably, defense counsel would be more willing to bring
their weak cases before a twelve-person jury . . . .On the other hand, prosecutors
would probably be more willing to bring their weak cases before a six-person jury
... .These two effects may offset each other in such a way that the cases brought
before six-person juries result in the same . . . conviction rate observed in a different
sample of cases brought before twelve-person juries.
Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 935.
68. For example, one possible method for exploring jury size effects on jury performance
has been suggested by Zeisel and Diamond, supra note 65, at 291. In this proposed experi-
ment, cases would be assigned to six or twelve-member juries by some random method and
the results of a large number of such cases would then be compared. But, this very
randomization may lead to constitutional problems. "This kind of randomization, even if
practical, might be unconstitutional, however, because one or the other group of defendants
would be favored without adequate justification." See Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 935.
69. Because social status and other factors have an impact on jury performance, it is im-
portant that laboratory experiments select jurors to avoid groups which deviate from the
norms of the general population in significant ways. For further discussion of this problem
and the particular hazards involved in the use of college students as "mock" jurors, see
Lempert, supra note 60, at 667 & n.70.
70. One of the weaknesses of laboratory experiments is that the test subjects "are given
limited time to solve problems quite different than. those faced by jurors." See Lempert,
supra note 60, at 667.
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unrealistic circumstances.7' Finally, if the researcher attempts to moni-
tor deliberation to insure its realism, the very act of monitoring, which
would be done presumably with the participants' knowledge, may in-
fluence the results.72
The third type of procedure that has been used to discover whether
size affects jury performance is deductive or mathematical modeling.
73
While this approach avoids many problems involved in the methods
just discussed, it has been used less frequently, probably because it is
more difficult to explain. The fact that causes confusion is that model-
ing is a technique that operates deductively on empirical input to pro-
duce a conclusion that is internally logical and consistent. 74  This
means that a "model" will produce results no more valid than the em-
pirical input with which one begins. Thus, when discussing evidence
based on modeling, one must be careful to explain the reliability of the
empirical data involved and the effects of possible changes in that data.
C. Arguments Favoring the Six-Member Jury
1. No Differences in Verdicts Exist
In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the six-member jury is
constitutional,75 basing its holding on the lack of convincing evidence
71. In their discussion of the "mock" jury technique, Nagel and Neef point out that "[t]he
approach has the disadvantage of lacking realistic jury trial procedure, personnel, and vari-
ety that may affect the comparisons." Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 937 n.9.
72. "One might note the potential problem that the monitoring process could make the
jury self-conscious and affect its deliberation, but the available evidence suggests that the
problem exists more in theory than in practice." Lempert, supra note 60, at 704 (footnote
omitted).
73. The best example of the effective use of deductive modeling in the area of jury size
research is the article by Nagel & Neef, supra note 23.
74. Though the development and use of a mathematical model can present complex prac-
tical problems, the underlying principles are simple and familiar. A model consists of from
one to several hundred interrelated equations. The formulation of the equations is the proc-
ess by which theoretical assumptions are translated into mathematical representations. The
variables in the equations represent the empirical data which will be plugged into the model.
Even the simple algebraic equation 3x = y is a model of sorts. The assumption it represents
is that y is three times as great as x. The independent variable x can be replaced by data
(e.g., real numbers such as 5, 12, or 62) and the dependent variable y will then give the
"answer."
In a model to determine an optimum jury size, the inputs will be data about how jurors
behave in various sized groups and the "answer" or outputs will be the numerical size of the
jury.
For a brief but thorough discussion of the theoretical aspects of deductive modeling, see
generally Nagel & Neef, supra note 62, at 937 & n.10.
75. See note 16 supra.
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of verdict differences between six- and twelve-member juries.76 Since
the Williams decision in 1970, there have been several empirical studies
and laboratory experiments indicating that there are indeed no verdict
differences between six- and twelve-member juries.7 7
2. Minorities Receive Adequate Representation by
Six-Member Juries
Proponents of the twelve-member jury contend that six-member ju-
ries do not adequately represent minority viewpoints. 78 One response
to this criticism has been that the Constitution does not require minor-
ity representation that is proportional to their numbers in the general
population.7 9 But, while improved minority representation may not be
constitutionally required, it is a factor that, for policy reasons, should
make the twelve-member jury preferable. Finally, though it may ap-
pear that the twelve-member jury would have an advantage in this
area, any perceived benefits are offset by the fact that the twelve-mem-
ber jury tends to factionalize. 80 The verdict of a twelve-member jury
reflects the strength of factions formed by three or four members and
the lower levels of participation by other jurors.8'
3. A Six-Member Jury Provides More Participant Satisfaction
Proponents of the six-member jury point to small group research to
show that groups with six members are more likely to produce satisfied
participants than are groups of twelve.8 2 This is an argument that does
not relate to verdict differences or to constitutional issues and is merely
claimed as an added advantage of the six-member system.
76. See note 24 supra. But in reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on studies that
involved surveys of judges and attorneys who commented on their experiences with six-
member civil juries. Zeisel, supra note 19, at 713-15.
77. E.g., I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 17; Michigan Study, supra note 20; Bermant & Cop-
pock, Outcomes ofSix and Twelve Member Jury Trials: An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the
State of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bermant & Cop-
pock]. See Jury Decision-Making Processes, supra note 17.
78. See section II.D.2 infra.
79. "All that the Constitution forbids, however, is systematic exclusion of identifiable seg-
ments of the community from jury panels and from the juries ultimately drawn from those
panels; a defendant may not, for example, challenge the makeup of a jury merely because no
members of his race are on the jury. ... Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 413.
80. See, e.g., Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, Six Member Juries in Criminal Cases.- Legal and
Psychological Considerations, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 615, 629-30 (1973).
81. Id.
82. For one study reaching the conclusion that smaller groups have more satisfied partici-
pants, see Hare, A Study of Interaction and Consensus in Dfferent Sized Groups, 17 AM. Soc.
REv. 261 (1952) (discussion of interaction, consensus, and leader skill in small groups).
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4. The Six-Member Jury Will Reduce Hung Juries
One of the best documented differences between six- and twelve-
member juries is that the smaller panels will fail to reach a verdict
("hang") in less than half as many cases as the larger panels.83 Propo-
nents of the six-member jury claim this as an advantage because the
outcome of a case is less likely to depend on the relative economic sta-
tus of the litigants.84 Furthermore, a decrease in the number of hung
juries helps reduce costs and allows judicial resources to be better
used. 5
5. The Quality of Decisions Is Comparable
The quality of decisions and the decision making process is of major
concern in the discussion of jury size. Several arguments have been
advanced to prove that the decision making process of the six-member
jury is as good, if not better, than that of the twelve-member jury. The
larger the jury, the more likely it is to break into factions 6 that can
adversely affect the deliberative process.87 It also should be pointed out
that a jury of six is much closer to the optimum jury size of seven,
which was tentatively established through deductive modeling by
Nagel and Neef.
88
6. Six-Member Juries Save Time and Money
One significant advantage of the six-member over the twelve-mem-
ber jury is that it saves time, thereby helping to reduce court conges-
tion. Some reduction in delay may, in part, be attributed to the fact
that six-member juries are less likely to hang.89 Also, it is possible that
83. Statistics indicate that twelve-member juries hang approximately five percent of the
time. See THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 60, at 453. But, one study indicated that ifa six-
member jury is used, this number is cut in half. See Zeisel, supra note 19, at 720.
84. When a hung jury occurs, the defendant is effectively acquitted unless the plaintiff (or
the prosecution in a criminal case) decides to go to the trouble and expense of retrying the
case. In the civil context, at least, this may be a significant factor because plaintiffs may be
deterred from retrying the case unless they are very wealthy or the case is extremely vital.
See generally Note, Smaller Juries and Non- Unanimity: Analysis and Proposed Revision ofthe
Ohio Jury System, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 583, 600 n.1 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Smaller
Juries].
85. "The greatest saving may well result from the reduction of hung juries, in which the
entire expense is irrevocably lost and nothing is accomplished." Id. at 602.
86. See 100-04 infra and accompanying text.
87. This argument seems to imply that if a jury factionalizes, attention will be focused on
"winning" the argument and not on rationally deliberating the merits of the case. See gener-
ally, Smaller Juries, supra note 84, at 600 n. 105.
88. See note 23 supra.
89. See notes 83 & 85 supra.
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the number of jury trials will be reduced because defendants will be
less inclined to request a jury.90 Furthermore, there is evidence that a
six-member jury will require less time than a twelve-member jury for
voir dire, 9' trial,92 and deliberation. 93
One obvious area of cost reduction is the savings directly attributable
to changing the number of jurors from twelve to six. 94 Presumably,
there also would be some cost reduction that would result indirectly
from the time savings discussed earlier.
D. Arguments Favoring the Twelve-Member Jury
1. Verdict Differences Exist That Favor Twelve-Member Juries
There are a number of arguments that, together, seem effectively to
rebut the contention that there exist no significant differences in the
verdicts of six and twelve-member juries.95 One argument is that the
differential rate of hung juries is clear evidence that the verdicts of the
two different-sized juries do in fact differ.96 Advocates of the twelve-
member jury argue that, at least in criminal cases, the hung jury is an
important safeguard for the defendant and that the twelve-member
jury is thus preferable. 97 Also, there have been serious methodological
criticisms of the studies supporting the conclusion that verdicts do not
90. "[T]he increased possibility that a six-member jury will deviate from a predictable
norm for juries means a larger "gamble" in requesting a jury. The increased risk could well
result in the increase in the incidence ofjury waiver and thereby reduce the incidence ofjury
trials." Note, Constitutional Law-Trial by Jury Guaranty of Seventh Amendment. Local
Court Rule May Establish Number ofJurors at Six in Federal Civil Cases, 49 WASH. L. REv.
1146, 1157 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Local Court Rule]. This argument seems logical, but
reduced delay at the cost of increased risk in our judicial system would seem to be a trade-
off of questionable value.
91. One study found that the average time consumed for voir dire in six-member jury
trials was, on the average, 45% less than that required for the twelve-member panels. See
I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 17, at 27.
92. The I.J.A. STUDY found that on the average, six-member juries reduced trial time by
almost 50%. Id. at 26-27.
93. The use of six-member juries may reduce deliberation time by as much as 32%. Id. at
29.
94. This point is based on the simple deduction that if one cuts in half the number of
jurors required per trial, jury fees, meals, accommodations and administrative costs will be
correspondingly reduced. See generally I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 17.
95. See Section II.C. I supra.
96. See note 83 supra.
97. "Kalven and Zeisel present some data that indicate that in almost two-thirds of hung-
jury cases the jury will have hung with a majority for conviction .... The findings are
corroborated... by the further finding with a much larger sample that in 80 per cent of the
cases in which the jury hangs the judge would vote to convict. . . ." Lempert, supra note
60, at 678 n.100 (citing THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 60, at 460)).
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vary with jury size.98 Finally, there is convincing proof that when the
number of jurors is reduced from twelve to six there is a substantial
increase in the likelihood that an innocent person will be convicted. 99
2. Minority Viewpoints Are Represented
One of the strongest arguments favoring the twelve-member jury is
that it better represents minority viewpoints."° Professor Zeisel has
demonstrated by simple statistical calculation that a six-member jury is
less likely than a twelve-member jury to contain one member from a
minority group' 01 and that there is an even greater difference in the
chance that two members from such a minority group would appear on
a six-memberjury. 0 2 This evidence is important because it shows that
a minority group has a much better chance of being represented on any
given twelve-member jury than on any given six-member jury. The
significance of this data increases when one realizes that while one mi-
nority juror is extremely unlikely to be able to maintain his views
under the pressure from the majority, two minority jurors have at least
a fair chance of holding out. 10 3 The presence of jurors from minority
groups is also important because it may suppress the expression of bias
98. The evidence relied upon by the Court in Williams was largely impressionistic and
was by no means solidly scientific. See note 76 supra. The I.J.A. STUDY and the Michigan
Study, supra note 17, have also been criticized for methodological weaknesses. See notes 64,
65 supra. Bermant & Coppock, supra note 77, have been criticized because the cases studied
involved an unusual workmen's compensation procedure and may, therefore, not provide a
sound basis for generalization. See Lempert, supra note 60, at 646 n.12. The laboratory
study in Jury Decision-Making Processes, supra note 17, is flawed because it used an ex-
tremely small sample and a case unlikely to reveal differences which might exist between
different-sized juries. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 65, at 286-87.
99. "[A]s the jury size decreases, the probability of convicting either an innocent or a
guilty defendant increases." Nagel & Neef, supra note 17, at 946.
100. For purposes of this discussion, a minority group is any subset of the community
which holds values substantially different from those held by the majority of the community.
However, while this definition is not limited to members of ethnic or racial minority groups,
there are clearly very important types of minority groups with especially strong interests to
protect.
101. Given a minority group which constitutes 10% of the population from which the jury
is drawn, a six-member jury will have a minority group members 53% of the time whereas
twelve-member juries would exclude all minority representatives in only 28% of all cases.
See Zeisel, supra note 19, at 716.
102. Using the same 10% minority group, a six-member jury will have two or more mem-
bers of the minority group in only 11% of all cases whereas a twelve-member jury would
have two or more minority group representatives 34% of the time. Id.
103. "[W]ithout initial support there is little or no chance that a single minority juror will
hold out against the majority." Lempert, supra note 60, at 676 n.98.
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by one person that could influence others."
An argument in support of the six-member jury was that proportion-
ate representation is not constitutionally required for any minority
group.'0 5 While this is true, it does not deal with the real issue-
whether six-member and twelve-member juries are so similar that the
six-member jury is acceptable under the sixth and seventh amend-
ments. 06 If the requirement of Williams that the jury be large enough
to prevent government oppression 0 7 can be read to mean that juries
should be large enough to prevent the majority from overwhelming the
minority, then the twelve-member jury would seem to be both prefera-
ble and constitutionally necessary.
The point was also made that the difference in minority representa-
tion may be counteracted by diminished participation in twelve-mem-
ber juries. 108 To some degree, the lower participation levels in the
twelve-member jury are due to the fact that more jurors are present to
divide up any given amount of time for deliberation. 0 9 Furthermore,
even though the twelve-member jury may factionalize more often, this
may not necessarily detract from the quality of deliberations because
the interaction between majority and minority, not the interaction be-
tween jurors as individuals, is the critical element in jury delibera-
tion. ''0
Finally, advocates of the six-member jury argue that juries are usu-
ally dominated by those of high social status, who have a higher level
104. See id. at 672.
Another possible advantage to the presence of minority group members on a jury is that
they may be able to provide valuable insights into aspects of the life styles and cultures of
the minorities they represent. In some cases this might help jurors unfamiliar with such
matters to better understand a case. Id. But it should be noted that this could very easily
result in minority group members acting as "cultural experts" and improperly influencing
the thinking of fellow jurors.
105. See note 79 supra.
106. See text and authorities cited in notes 46 & 47 supra.
107. 399 U.S. at 100.
108. See Lempert, supra note 60 at 693.
109. "[Tlhis difference is in part artifactual. Assuming equal participation by each mem-
ber, the percentage participation of members of a larger group will always be less than the
percentage participation of members of smaller groups ... " Lempert, supra note 60, at
693. See, Local Court Rule, supra note 90, at 1156-57.
110. It has already been mentioned, see note 79 supra, that twelve-member juries are
more likely than six-member juries to deliberate in factions. There is some evidence that
this phenomenon forces those jurors who find themselves in the minority to participate
more. This means that the levels of participation between minority and majority factions
are usually relatively equal so that, taken in combination, these results reduce the impact of
the evidence indicating low participation levels for individuals. See Lempert, supra note 60,
at 695-98 & nn.166-180.
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of participation than those of a low social status.' If one assumes that
members of minority groups are usually of a lower social status, the
conclusion would be that even though twelve-member juries include
more minority group members, these members contribute little to the
decision, meaning that the larger jury may not be much better than the
six-member jury. While this analysis may diminish the representative
capacity of twelve-member juries, it does not prove that six-member
juries provide equivalent or even adequate representation.
3. Hung Juries Are Desirable Because They Favor The Defendant
One might assume that both the defendant and prosecution or plain-
tiff have an equal opportunity to benefit from the indecisive result of a
hung jury. However, in the overwhelming majority of criminal cases,
the defendant benefits from a hung jury."' It is true that a hung jury
does not preclude retrial and the possibility of ultimate conviction.
However, retrial is expensive and rarely occurs, so that a hung jury is,
in many instances, the functional equivalent of an acquittal.' 3
In the civil setting, a reduction of hung juries may diminish the ad-
vantage afforded to those of high economic status.' Thus, in civil
cases the fact that six-member juries reduce hung juries may represent
an advantage for the smaller jury. But, in criminal cases the advan-
tages afforded the defendant by a hung jury may be sufficient to out-
weigh any monetary savings resulting from the use of the six-member
jury.,15
4. Twelve-Member Juries Render Better Decisions
When considering the arguments regarding the quality of decisions
rendered by the six- and twelve-member juries, it is important to focus
on the meaning of "quality" in this setting. Perhaps one of the best
approaches is that used by Nagel and Neef, who discussed the "quali-
ty" of decisions in terms of the number of innocent persons convicted
111. It is known that individuals with high social status serve on juries more frequently
and have higher levels of participation in the deliberative process than do low status individ-
uals. When combined with the fact that low participators will contribute even less to a
twelve-member jury than to a six-member jury, see note 108 supra, it is logical to assume
that low status individuals will have less input, and therefore less influence, on a twelve-
member jury than on ajury of six. This result may counteract to, some degree, the increased
representation that twelve-member juries seem to provide. See, Local Court Rule, supra note
90, at 1156-57.
112. See note 98 supra.
113. See Lempert, supra note 60, at 678 n.100.
114. See note 84 supra.
115. See, Smaller Juries, supra note 84, at 602.
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and the number of guilty persons acquitted.' "6 If it is assumed that the
possibility of convicting an innocent person is thirteen times more seri-
ous than the possibility of releasing a truly guilty individual,' 7 the
twelve-member jury is the best decision-maker."18 However, if it is
only assumed to be ten times more serious to convict an innocent per-
son than to release a guilty person, 19 a six-member jury is probably a
better decision-maker. 20 Thus, a relatively small change in the weight-
ing factor can change the determination of an optimum jury size.' 2 '
Another measure of the quality of the jury decision is consistency. It
has been demonstrated that the decisions of six-member juries tend to
be less consistent and more subject to random deviation than those of
twelve-member juries. 22 This favors a jury of twelve because, al-
though consistency does not automatically lead to accuracy, it does
seem to improve the likelihood that accurate decisions will result. Also,
consistency and dependability of result may itself be an advantage be-
cause it gives the appearance of fairness.
Advocates of the twelve-member jury also point out that much of the
advantage claimed for the six-member jury in the area of decision-
making rests on the results of laboratory experiments involving small
groups. 2 3 Because of the weaknesses of this research technique, 24
these results are suspect. It is also pointed out that there are circum-
stances in which the very presence of several additional jurors can be
important in reaching an accurate decision.'25 Finally, there is some
evidence that heterogeneous groups are more likely to make correct
116. See note 49 supra.
117. After consideration of their empirical premises and the data utilized in their study,
Nagel and Heef concluded that "society by supporting the twelve-person unanimous jury
considers convicting the innocent 13 times worse than not convicting the guilty and is im-
pliedly willing to let 13 guilty persons go free to save one innocent person from conviction."
Nagel & Neef, supra note 13, at 959.
118. Id. at 959 n.33.
119. See note 49 supra.
120. Id.
121. This is a highly significant result of the Nagel and Heef model because it domon-
strates the importance of normative values on the determination of an optimum jury size.
122. No matter how one varies the basic assumptions about jury performance, one result
that is constant is that six-member juries will render decisions that deviate farther from the
average and are thus more likely to reflect error and chance factors. Nagel & Neef, supra
note 23, at 972-73 and accompanying text.
123. For a relatively comprehensive discussion of the small group research which sup-
ports the use of a six-member jury, see Lempert, supra note 60, at 689-98.
124. See text and authorities cited in notes 69-72 supra.
125. Twelve-member juries are likely to perform better when the decision is of the intui-
tive nature and when memory is a critical element. Lempert, supra note 60, at 686-87.
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decisions than homogeneous groups."' Since twelve-member juries
are more likely to include representatives of minority groups, 27 such a
jury would be more heterogenous than one of six members and thus
more likely to reach a correct decision.
5. Six-Member Juries May Not Be Advantageous in
Terms of Saving Time and Money
While adoption of the six-member jury will probably save time and
money,12 these savings may not be as significant as they appear.' 29 In
essence, advocates of twelve-member juries argue that the savings of
time and money must be balanced against the decrease in quality and
the diminished representation of minorities. 30  Depending on how
these competing interests are weighed, the six-member jury may or
may not be advantageous.
6. The Twelve-Member Jury Better Represents the Community
The argument here is that the twelve-member jury is more likely to
render decisions that approximate the decisions the community would
make should all members of the community sit in judgment on the
case. ' 3 ' This argument may be true, but it seems to suggest only that
the twelve-member jury will be more popular, not that it will render a
better decision. However, since the concept of jury trial is based on
judgment by one's peers, there may be something to be said for this
argument in a philosophical sense.
126. See Thomas & Fink, supra note 23, at 381.
127. See notes 101-02 supra.
128. See notes 85, 90-94 supra.
129. At least one study has concluded that voir dire time would not be substantially re-
duced and that overall trial time and court congestion would not be significantly affected by
the reduction of juries from twelve to six members. These results appear to be explained by
the fact that there is a high overhead involved injury selection which must be paid whether
juries are composed of six or twelve members. Another factor is that the number of chal-
lenges of jurors remained virtually the same after jury size was reduced from six to twelve.
This means that about the same amount of time would be spent in impaneling a jury of six
as a jury of twelve. See Pabst, supra note 17, at 327-28.
130. In Ballew, the Court recognized that it is important to balance the potential savings
in time and money against the important constitutional values threatened by reducing the
size ofjuries. 435 U.S. at 243.
131. "[T]he twelve-member jury is more likely than the six-member jury to have a pro-
plaintiff majority when a majority of the community would favor the plaintiff and it is more
likely to have a pro-defendant majority when a majority of the community would favor the
defendant." Lempert, supra note 60, at 684.
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7. Tradition Favors Twelve
The twelve-member jury has a foundation deeply rooted in tradition
and history. This foundation may be the basis of an argument for the
retention of the twelve-member jury.' 32 Furthermore, it also has been
argued that the Constitution does not permit weighing the merits of
various jury sizes but instead mandates the number twelve because this
was the universally accepted practice in the eighteenth century.
33
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although more research is required in some areas,' 34 it is possible to
reach some conclusions based upon available information about the
effects of size on jury performance. It does appear that six-member
juries may produce some savings in time and in money.' 35 However,
twelve-member juries clearly represent the community in general'
36
and minority groups'37 in particular more effectively than do six-mem-
ber juries. Evidence on the quality of decision-making is in conflict,
but on balance it appears that twelve-member juries are superior in this
respect. 13
8
The six-member jury may reduce the number of hung juries139 and
produce more satisfied participants.140 But, a twelve-member jury will
132. Zeisel argues that the number twelve was selected by a several hundred year long
trial and error search for the appropriate sized jury, and that it is by no means an accident.
See Zeisel, supra note 19, at 712.
133. In Colgrove, the majority reasoned that jury size was only constitutionally significant
if it affected jury performance. Finding no evidence of such a relationship, the Court upheld
the reduction injury size. 413 U.S. at 157. But, in his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out:
Today a majority of this Court may find six-man juries to represent a proper balance
between competing demands of expedition and group representation. But as dockets
become more crowded and pressures on jury trials grow, who is to say that some future
Court will not find three, or two, or one a number large enough to satisfy its unexpli-
cated sense of justice? It should be clear that the constitutional rights which are so
vulnerable to pressures of the moment are not really protected by the Constitution at
all....
Since some definition of "jury" must be chosen, I would therefore rely on the fixed
bounds of history which the Framers, by drafting the Seventh Amendment, meant to
"preserve."
Id. at 181-82. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Nagel and Neef point out that their model could more precisely predict jury behav-
ior given good empirical data. See Nagel & Neef, supra note 23, at 978.
135. Despite the findings of Pabst, see note 129 supra, it is fair to assume that some of the
time and money savings claimed for the six-member jury are valid. See notes 90-94 supra.
136. See note 131 supra.
137. See notes 101-02 supra.
138. See sections II.C.5 and II.D.4 supra.
139. See note 83 supra.
140. See note 82 supra.
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behave more consistently and in accord with community standards' 4'
and will allow more people to participate in the judicial process.
1 42
Thus, the real problem is one of weighing competing interests. In
effect, the question becomes, is the associated price in extra time and
expense that is necessitated by the twelve-member jury justified in or-
der to obtain better minority representation, better quality decisions,
and more public participation? While the decision may be a difficult
one to reach with respect to civil cases, the choice seems much clearer
in the criminal context. The twelve-member jury is less likely to con-
vict an innocent person. 143 Twelve-member juries also hang more fre-
quently, which affords a criminal defendant an extra margin of
safety.1" Given a criminal justice system that presumes one innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, these are extremely sig-
nificant advantages.
The twelve-member jury may be, and in the criminal context proba-
bly is, superior to smaller juries. But, this does not, in and of itself,
change the state of the law. Williams and Colgrove still permit the use
of six-member juries in state criminal and federal civil trials. However,
as indicated earlier, 14 the Ballew decision seems to weaken the posi-
tion of the Court and gives rise to speculation that a reversal of Wil-
liams and Colgrove is within the realm of possibilities. 146
Regardless of its outcome, the controversy over jury size may pro-
vide a valuable lesson in the use of scientific research in courts. Sophis-
ticated and capable men who sit on the United States Supreme Court
have been heavily criticized for their use of social science research
141. See note 131 supra.
142. This is simply a result of the inescapable fact that if we use twelve-member juries
twice as many people will get a chance to participate in the judicial process than if we use
six-member juries.
143. See note 99 supra.
144. See note 97 supra.
145. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
146. In this case, the Court might be more willing than usual to reverse its earlier position
because the issue is one of constitutional interpretation, and there is considerable empirical
evidence favoring a change. These are precisely the conditions the Court itself identified as
necessary to justify disregarding the general rule of stare decisis:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly
true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had
by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical
sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (footnotes omitted).
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bearing on the issue of jury size.147 Commentators and courts must be
careful to use scientific research when it is available and to avoid
under- or overstating its implications when it is used. Because of the
difficulties and dangers inherent in the use of scientific evidence, there
may be considerable merit in Justice Marshall's argument that the
Constitution should be interpreted by fixed historical standards. 48 Re-
search and statistical analysis can determine facts and define issues, but
in the final analysis, policy decisions must rest on value judgments
concerning the relative merit of competing interests.
Ralph Black
147. See Zeisel, note 19 supra; Zeisel & Diamond, note 65 supra, at 281-82.
148. See note 133 supra.
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